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Abstract (229 words): 
  
Thailand’s military has recently reclaimed its role as the central pillar of Thai politics. This raises 
an enduring question in civil-military relations: why do people with guns choose to obey those 
without guns? One of the most prominent theories in both academic and policy circles is Samuel 
Huntington’s argument that professional militaries do not become involved in politics. We 
engage this premise in the Thai context. Utilizing data from a new and unique survey of 569 Thai 
military officers as well as results from focus groups and interviews with military officers, we 
evaluate the attitudes of Thai servicemen and develop a test of Huntington’s hypothesis. We 
demonstrate that increasing levels of professionalism are generally poor predictors as to whether 
or not a Thai military officer prefers an apolitical military. Indeed, our research suggests that 
higher levels of professionalism as described by Huntington may run counter to civilian control 
of the military. These findings provide a number of contributions. First, the survey allows us to 
operationalize and measure professionalism at the individual level. Second, using these measures 
we are able to empirically test Huntington’s hypothesis that more professional soldiers should 
prefer to remain apolitical. Finally, we provide an uncommon glimpse at the opinions of Thai 
military officers regarding military interventions, adding to the relatively sparse body of 
literature on factors internal to the Thai military which push officers toward politics.  
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Introduction 
 In September, 2013, the Commander-in-Chief of Thailand’s Army, General Prayut Chan-
ocha warned politicians that “they’d better watch out.” Addressing reporters, Prayuth declared 
that the people were growing weary of political conflicts plaguing the country.1 Only eight 
months later in May 2014, the general made good on his threat by staging the second coup in less 
than a decade.2 Prayuth’s comments were a not-so-gentle reminder that, even during civilian rule, 
the Thai military remains intimately involved in politics.  
 While such events are unsurprising to most scholars familiar with Thailand, it is 
indicative of a fundamental tension in politics. How does a civilian government maintain control 
over its counterparts in the military, or as Holmes3 asks, “Why do people with guns obey people 
without guns?” One popular response based on the work of Samuel Huntington is that the most 
effective insurance for civilian control of the military is through increasing the level of 
professionalism in the officer corps. Soldiers’ commitment to be professionals is also a 
commitment to remain generally separate from politics.4 While this thesis has been contested,5 
                                                 
1 “Army Leader Warns Politicians to Cease Continual Quarreling,” Bangkok Post, 16 September 2013.  
2 For a detailed discussion of the 2014 coup, see International Crisis Group (ICG), A Coup Ordained? Thailand’s 
Prospects for Stability (Brussels: ICG, 3 December 2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-
asia/thailand/263-a-coup-ordained-thailand-s-prospects-for-stability.pdf, accessed 04 December 2014.  
3 Stephan Holmes, “Lineages of the Rule of Law,” in Democracy and the Rule of Law, eds. Jose Maria Maravall and 
Adam Przeworski. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 24. See also Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-
Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 
23(1996): 149-178. 
4 Huntington, Samuel, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957). 
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the professionalism argument remains popular in both academic and policy circles, being taught 
at the United States Military Academy for many years.6 Indeed, the US military curriculum 
based in part on Huntington’s professionalism argument has long been part of Thailand’s officer 
training, and most military officials are aware of Huntington’s theory.7 Academically, it has 
likewise been applied to explain the Thai military’s withdrawal from politics from 1992 through 
2006.8 
 In this essay, we provide evidence that Huntington’s thesis on professionalization does 
not hold in the Thai context. The level of professionalism among Thai military officers, at least 
as defined by Huntington, has little to do with their feelings about whether or not they should be 
involved in politics. Using a new opinion survey of 569 Thai military officers, we demonstrate 
that among our respondents, higher scores along most measures of professionalism do not 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on 
Horseback. 5th printing. (New Brunswick, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962). See also James Burk, “Theories of 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29(2002): 7-29.   
6 Suzanne Nielsen, “Review Article: American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of 
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State,” International Affairs 88(2012): 369-376. Christopher P. Gibson, 
Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 70. Feaver, “The Civil-Military,” 150-155. 
7 Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014. See also Jennifer Morrison Taw, Thailand and the 
Philippines: Case Studies in US IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development, (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1994), 26-27.  
8 Surachart Bamrungsak, “Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,” in Military Professionalism in Asia: 
Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001), 77-91.  See 
also the critique offered by James Ockey, “Thailand’s Professional Soldiers and Coup-Making: The Coup of 2006,” 
Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19(2007): 97.  
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necessarily coincide with a desire to remain apolitical. These findings imply that theories of 
civilian control over the military in developing countries should not focus on the definitions of 
professionalism currently found in the literature. Instead, we suggest that further research needs 
to be conducted regarding the incentives and motivations within politically active militaries, an 
area that has received relatively scant attention in Thai studies.  
 Thus this article makes a number of contributions. First, we present findings from a new 
survey of the Thai military. As one of the more politically active militaries in the world, this 
grants us an unprecedented glimpse into military opinions regarding political interventions. It 
also allows us to measure professionalism at an individual level. Second, drawing on this dataset 
as well as focus groups and interviews, we provide an empirical test of Huntington’s hypothesis 
that professional soldiers should prefer to be apolitical. Third, we speak to the Thailand-specific 
literature, furnishing new insight on the military as well as suggesting directions for future 
research.  
 The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. In Section II we review the definition of 
professionalism and identify two major shortcomings in its application. We then briefly review 
the approaches Thailand specialists use to explain coups in Section III before turning to our 
survey. In Section IV we explain our data collection methods. Section V describes measures for 
each of the components of professionalism Huntington outlined, weighing professionalism at the 
individual level. We then statistically test a version of Huntington’s hypothesis, demonstrating 
that professionalism is a poor predictor of an officer’s support for an apolitical military. We also 
discuss the findings of the analysis. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude by identifying the 
implications of these findings for Thailand and for the question of civilian control over the 
military. We also offer some suggestions about further research.  
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Are Professionals Apolitical?  
 Samuel Huntington famously argued that one of the best guarantees for civilian control 
over the military is the development of professionalism in the officer corps.9 While states could 
rely on powerful politicians or interest groups to control the military, this type of subjective 
control potentially politicizes the military and is a dubious way of ensuring civilian supremacy.10 
In contrast, Huntington advocated the importance of objective control, or the reliance on military 
professionalism.11 As the military becomes more professional, officers will remain in the 
barracks to pursue their career ambitions as soldiers. Having a professional officer corps creates 
an apolitical military, allowing civilian authority to prevail. Thus Huntington’s hypothesis, at 
least in relation to civil control over the military, is that the more professional the soldier, the less 
likely he will engage in politics.12 Despite being based on the narrow American experience, this 
hypothesis has been broadly applied to militaries around the world. It also spawned numerous 
responses, including many challenges, both empirical and theoretical.13  
 Empirically, while the American case upon which Huntington’s argument was based 
offered no leverage to test his proposition, research on developing states provides strong 
                                                 
9 Huntington, Soldier, 7. See also Morris Janowitz, “Civic Consciousness and Military Performance,” in The 
Political Education of Soldiers, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 55-
80.  
10 Huntington, Soldier, 80-82. 
11 Huntington, Soldier, 94-97.  
12 Feaver wrote the hypothesis slightly differently: “A professional military will always remain subordinate to 
civilian authority.” Feaver “The Civil-Military,” 161.  
13 For more detailed reviews of this literature, see Burk, “Theories of Democratic,” 7-29. Also see Peter D. Feaver, 
“Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2(1999): 211-241. 
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challenges to Huntington’s claim. Militaries in Pakistan,14 across the Middle East,15 and Latin 
America16 all became much more involved in politics after going through periods of 
professionalization. While the scholars addressing these countries did not explicitly test 
Huntington’s claims, they each suggested that the hypothesis was problematic. Supposedly 
professional military officers, often those who had received American training, appear to have 
little compunction in conducting coups.17  
Theoretically, scholars have proposed a variety of reasons that professionalism could 
actually be counterproductive to civilian control and a political military. Possible causes for 
professional soldiers to intervene in politics range from political threats on their 
professionalism18 to preserving order in society19 to bureaucratic structures and behavior.20 In 
                                                 
14 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014), 256.  
15 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political 
Science Quarterly 115(2000): 67-92.  
16 Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982), 42-44, 376-380.  
17 Recent work provides contradictory findings regarding the effect of American training on coup likelihood. See 
Tomislav Z. Ruby and Doublas Gibler, “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad,” 
European Journal of International Relations 16, No. 3 (2010): 339-364; Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. 
Caverley, “American Foreign Military Training and Coup Propensity,” Working Paper, 
http://www.jonathancaverley.com/uploads/2/9/7/2/29726853/caverleysavage_otago.pdf, accessed 18 June 2015.  
18 Finer, Horseback, 25-30.  
19 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1977).  See also Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1972), 62-66. 
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essence, these critics of the Huntington hypothesis propose a counter-claim of their own: 
Professional soldiers may actually be more prone to interventions.  
While more recent work has tried to push past this debate,21 Huntington’s thesis and its 
critics served as important advances and are the basis for much of today’s work on civil-military 
relations. They also remain prominent in both policy and theoretical circles.22 Even so, 
quantitative tests of these hypotheses are “virtually nonexistent.”23 This is partly due to the fact 
that they suffer from two major shortcomings that inhibit empirical testing. 
First, the unit of analysis is problematic. Much of this literature treats the military in 
totality, thus the degree of professionalism would be measured based on the organization as a 
unit. On the contrary, militaries are not unified blocks in which all officers share the same level 
of professionalism. Indeed, they are often rife with divisions that shape their political ambitions, 
as Geddes has argued.24 Reflecting this, specialists on Thai politics have often highlighted 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Edward Luttwak, Coup D’etat: A Practical Handbook, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 19-21, 
35-36. Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 2, 85. Beyond the three points listed here, 
Belkin and Schofer identified twenty-one causes of coups in the literature, a number of which could be theoretically 
tied to professionalism arguments. See Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of 
Coup Risk,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, No 5 (2003): 600-605.  
21 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 235-236. Feaver “The Civil-Military,” 169-170. Jonathan Powell, 
“Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’ètat,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6): 1019-1021.  
22 Nielsen, “Review Article,” 369-370. Burk, “Theories of Democratic,” 8-9.  
23 Powell, “Determinants,” 1022.  
24 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2(1999): 125-129.  
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divisions within the Thai military in their discussion of the 2006 coup and its aftermath.25 In this 
perspective, military obedience to civilian authority hinges on the organization’s own internal 
coherence and politicking. 
  Thus assigning a professionalism value to an entire organization is dubious. Testing 
Huntington’s hypothesis requires being better able to differentiate professional soldiers from less 
professional soldiers within the body. Professional soldiers might indeed prefer to remain 
apolitical while their unprofessional counterparts drag them into politics. We argue, therefore, 
that professionalism should be measured at a more basic level than the entire organization, such 
as at the individual officer level.  
 The second major obstacle to empirical testing found in the literature above is the 
operationalization of professionalism. In many cases, following Huntington’s example, the 
application of the term is somewhat tautological. A professional military does not get involved in 
politics. Since this military is not involved in politics, it is professional. Such an approach does 
not give us much analytical leverage. Others have measured professionalism through the 
acquisition of technology, training, or military funding.26 These proxies, though, are far from the 
concept Huntington proposed. In order to test the hypothesis, we must first gauge 
professionalism. How do we identify a professional military officer when we see one?  
 Both of these obstacles, unit of analysis and operationalization, hinder any attempt to 
evaluate the claim that professionalism should lead to civilian control of the military. In the 
                                                 
25 Ockey, “Professional Soldiers,” 95-127.  See also James Ockey, “Broken Power: The Thai Military in the 
Aftermath of the 2006 Coup,” in “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s 
Downfall, ed. Pavin Chachavalpongpun. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2014), 49-78. Paul Chambers, “Thailand on 
the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy,” Asian Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 850-854.  
26 Kamrava, “Military Professionalization,” 69-70. Powell, “Determinants,” 1022.  
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remainder of this essay, we address these two issues with a new dataset based on a recent survey 
conducted among Thai military officers. The data from this survey allows us to define and 
measure professionalism at the individual officer level as well as develop a test of the 
Huntington hypothesis. Before discussing our data, though, we demonstrate how this project 
contributes to the literature specific to Thailand.  
A Political Military 
 Thailand is among the most coup-prone countries in the world.27 As Thailand’s long 
history of military coups and coup attempts has been documented elsewhere,28 we do not recount 
it. Instead we briefly review common explanations of coups found in the literature. Scholars on 
Thai politics provide a number of accounts for military influence in politics, especially the most 
recent coups in 2006 and 2014. These can be organized into two categories based on 
Zimmerman’s “pull” and “push” factors, with pull factors being those conditions in politics or 
society that create space for military intervention and push factors being those internal to the 
military that encourage politicization.29  
                                                 
27 For the years 1946 through 2010. See Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, and Paul W. Chambers, 
Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1-11. Thailand has 
experienced at least nineteen coup attempts from 1912 through 2014, although using a broader definition of coup, 
Chambers identifies more than thirty events during the same period. Paul Chambers, ed., Knights of the Realm: 
Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), 583-587.   
28 Paul Chambers, “A Short History of Military Influence in Thailand,” in Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military 
and Police, Then and Now, ed. Paul Chambers (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), 109-421. Thak Chaloemtiarana, 
Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. (Ithaca NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2007), 
Chapters 1 & 2. ICG, A Coup Ordained, 9-16.   
29 Ekkart Zimmerman, Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research (Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman Publishing Co., 1983), 246-281.  
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By far, the dominant approach among scholars of Thai politics has been a focus on the 
sociopolitical determinants, or pull factors, for coups. These can be further subdivided along 
three main themes, although each is not exclusive. Thailand specialists often apply more than 
one of the themes in their discussion of Thai military interventions. The first theme suggests that 
much of the fault for military intervention lies at the feet of politicians themselves, especially 
those of Thaksin Shinawatra. Some scholars considered the Thai military to have retreated to the 
barracks by the late 1990s, due in part to the reprimand it had received following General 
Suchinda’s failed attempt to rule the country as Prime Minister in 1992 as well as the 
promulgation of the 1997 Constitution.30 When Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in 
2001 he sought to solidify his power base, which included regular involvement in the annual 
military reshuffle to ensure that military officers favorable to his government found their way 
into top positions.31 This “repoliticization” of the military was meant to remove one potential 
threat to Thaksin’s continued rule, but it also encouraged military officers to reengage with the 
                                                 
30 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Old Soldiers Never Die, They are Just Bypassed,” in Political Change in Thailand, ed. 
Kevin Hewison (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 42-57. Surachart, “Thailand,” 77-85. Other scholars argue that 
the military had never truly disengaged from politics due to its close connections with the unelected power brokers 
in Thai politics, especially the palace. Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathamanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2005), 127-134. James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-
Military Relations” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah 
Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 208. 
31 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin, 2nd ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2009), 176-184. 
McCargo and Ukrist, Thaksinization, 134-140.  
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political sphere.32 In this perspective, military leaders staged the 2006 coup and remained active 
in politics thereafter in order to preserve their power and autonomy from political meddling. This 
explanation suggests that the missteps of politicians, especially Thaksin and those who followed 
him, are partly to blame for military interventions.  
 Second, institutional analyses focus on the fact that the Thai state’s democratic structures 
are comparatively weak and unable to reign in their unelected counterparts.33 Political parties are 
poorly institutionalized,34 and constitutions and courts are weak and subject to capture.35 In 
contrast, scholars highlight the strength of the “tripartite tutelage” of the monarchy, the Privy 
Council, and the military, which have historically been able to dominate elected civilians.36  
Strong and enduring links between military officers and the palace, especially between members 
of the Privy Council and top military leaders, have ensured that the military remains intimately 
enshrined in the political atmosphere.37 Such ties are especially relevant as questions of 
                                                 
32 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thaksin, the Military, and Thailand’s Protracted Political Crisis,” in The Political 
Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2011), 54-56.  
33 This is similar to Zimmerman’s “praetorianism” category. Zimmerman, Political Violence, 257-268.  
34 Erik M. Kuhonta, “Thailand’s Feckless Parties and Party System: A Path Dependent Analysis,” in Party 
Institutionalization in Asia, ed. Allen Hicken and Erik M. Kuhonta (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 280-306. Allen Hicken, “Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai,” Journal of 
East Asian Studies 6(2006): 388-389.  
35 Erik M. Kuhonta and Aim Sinpeng, “Democratic Regression in Thailand: The Ambivalent Role of Civil Society 
and Political Institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 36, no 3 (2014): 345-351.  
36 Chambers, “Thailand on the Brink,” 837-839.  
37 McCargo and Ukrist, Thaksinization, 127-134. See also Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy 
Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 4(2005): 503-509.  
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monarchic succession have emerged.38 Thus the institutional arrangement of Thai politics 
matches weak democratic institutions with historically strong non-democratic institutions. As the 
younger democratic system provided challenges to its predecessors, military coups occurred to 
protect historic power structures.  
 Third, society-based explanations describe the events leading up to the recent coups as a 
result of competition and polarization between different segments of Thai society.39 On the one 
hand are clashes between the new elites, represented by Thaksin, and the old elites, which 
include the bureaucracy, military, and palace.40 Such elite conflicts draw the military into politics. 
On the other hand are considerations of the broader shifts in society, including the rise of 
peasants into the middle class41 and the tensions created by inequality. In this narrative, class 
conflict has become especially important in describing the events leading to military 
interventions. These analyses highlight the 2010 unrest wherein scholars have identified the role 
of inequality and class conflict in creating public unrest, especially in April and May of 2010 
when the United Democratic Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) took to the streets 
of Bangkok before being brutally suppressed.42 Later, in late 2013 through early 2014, the 
                                                 
38 Andrew MacGregor Marshall, A Kingdom in Crisis (London: Zed Books, 2014), 186-207.  
39 These roughly align with Zimmerman’s “social mobilization” and “democracy and political culture” categories. 
Zimmerman, Political Violence, 255-256, 268-269. On polarization see Suchit Bunbongkan, “What Went Wrong 
with the Thai Democracy?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2015): 360-364. 
40 Kevin Hewison, “A Book, the King, and the 2006 Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, No. 1 (2008): 205-
207.  
41 Andrew Walker, Thailand’s Political Peasants (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).  
42 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand: The Lessons of Protest,” Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspective on Asia 50, 
No. 1(2014): 11-13.  
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middle and upper classes, facing the potential of wealth distribution and feeling more 
comfortable with the traditional elites, called for military intervention to forestall democracy.43 
These conflicts between different segments of society, at both the elite and popular level, have 
created situations in which the military felt compelled to intervene in the political system.  
 Such pull factors are extremely important in understanding Thailand’s military 
interventions, especially reflecting the fact that the majority of Thai specialists use one or more 
of them to understand the impetus for a coup. Even so, politicians’ faux pas, a combination of 
weak democratic and strong unelected institutions, and contentious shifts in society only create 
the environment for a military intervention. They fail to address the supply side of the equation: 
why, despite decades of professionalization training, often provided by the USA and based on 
Huntington’s claims, did military officers still see fit to intervene?  
The motivations internal to the military deserve attention. Among Thailand specialists, 
these push factors have accounted for a relatively small body of work on Thai civil-military 
relations.  
 The primary focus in this area has been on competition between military factions. In this 
perspective, the 2006 coup occurred due to struggles between different factions in the military, 
especially the army, which has led most political interventions. The organizational structure of 
the military draws on loyalty to graduating classes from the Armed Forces Preparatory School 
(AFPS) and each branches’ prospective military academy.44 Promotions are often based on 
networks drawn from these graduating classes, thus creating strong competition between 
                                                 
43 Nicholas Farrelly, “Why Democracy Struggles: Thailand’s Elite Coup Culture,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 67, No. 3 (2013): 290-292.  
44 John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano, “Coup Calculations in Thailand,” Asia Times Online, 17 January 2014, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-170114.html, accessed 15 June 2015.  
14 
 
different cohorts as they rise through the ranks. That competition became especially strong in the 
mid-2000s due to a sharp increase in admissions to the Royal Military Academy in the early 
1970s as well as a shrinking budget in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Prime 
Minister Thaksin became patron of Class 21 (1969), which had attended the Armed Forces 
Academies Preparatory School alongside him.45 As this faction, also known as Wongthewan, 
began to rise up the ranks of the army assisted by the Prime Minister, another faction closely 
associated with Privy Councilor General Prem Tinsulanonda felt threatened. This group, called 
the Eastern Tigers or Queen’s Guard, viewed itself as more “professional” than others, and was 
resistant to the growing role of civilian politicians in determining military promotion.46 As the 
2006 military reshuffle approached, competition grew fierce among the various military 
factions.47 The coup came shortly before the promotion list was to be issued, allowing the coup 
leaders to control the process and promote their own faction as well as increase the military 
budget.48 Thus, in this perspective, internal military politics were a major force behind the 2006 
coup.  
As of writing, relatively few academic pieces have emerged discussing the internal 
tensions in the military relative to the 2014 coup; instead scholars have continued to focus on the 
                                                 
45 Before entering politics, Thaksin was a lieutenant colonel in the Royal Thai Police and had been part of Class 10 
of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School.  
46 It should be noted here that “professional” in this context is self-perception rather than an evaluation based on 
Huntington’s criteria. Ockey, “Professional Soldiers,” 104-107.  
47 Chambers, “A Short History,” 272-274.  
48 Ockey, “Broken Power,” 56-57.  
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pull factors of protests and institutional conflict.49 The Eastern Tigers continue to dominate most 
top army posts following the 2006 coup, but there has been growing pressure for recognition of 
the Wongthewan and other pro-Thaksin officers, which are more common among lower ranks.50 
Factions have remained important after the coup, as reshuffles have been used to consolidate the 
Eastern Tigers’ hold on top offices.  
Beyond factions, though, relatively little research has been conducted on either 
professionalism in the Thai military or the opinions of military officers regarding interventions, 
despite the fact that professionalism is widely taught and touted among the officer corps.51 
Surachart argued that rising professionalism was one of the reasons behind the military 
withdrawal from politics in the 1990s. Surachart, though, adopts both of the shortcomings of the 
professionalism literature by assigning the characteristic to the military as a whole while also 
defining military professionalism as “equivalent to noninvolvement in politics.”52 Ockey, on the 
other hand, does focus on factions within the military, one of which he labeled “Professional 
Soldiers.” He, though, points out that this “professional” faction of the military was based on 
self-perception rather than strict adherence to Huntington’s definition.53  
                                                 
49 Duncan McCargo, “Thailand in 2014: The Trouble with Magic Swords,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2015): 338-342. 
McCargo does provide a few paragraphs (pp. 344-345) discussing the motivations of top leaders in the military, but 
this is not his main focus. See also Suchit, “What Went Wrong,” 359-369.  
50 Paul Chambers, “Thailand’s Divided Military,” The Wall Street Journal, 30 June 2014.  
51 Army Officer, interview by authors, 26 January 2014. Taw, Case Studies in US IMET Training, 20-27. Thailand is 
one of the top recipients of US funding for military training through the IMET program, which includes emphasis on 
professionalization based, in part, on Huntington’s work.     
52 Surachart, “Thailand,” 77.  
53 Ockey, “Professional Soldiers,” 107-117.  
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To the best of our knowledge, only two previous works have surveyed the opinions of 
Thai military officers regarding military interventions. Shortly after the 1991 coup, Phrutipongse 
sought to test the effect of a training program on officer opinions, including questions regarding 
political interventions. At that time, many officers in his survey felt that the military should not 
get involved in politics, although a large proportion (51.6 percent) of the officers were in favor of 
the coup.54 The survey, though, was limited to thirty-one officers, it also failed to provide any 
measures of professionalism. A second piece produced in 1991 evaluated opinions of 162 
students in the military officer school regarding democracy, including questions about military 
interventions.55 The analysis, though, failed to report all of the survey results and focused more 
on definitions of democracy than on professional norms in the military.  
 In sum, most of the Thailand-specific literature seeking to understand the role of coups in 
Thai political life has placed scant focus on the incentives and opinions of military leaders, 
despite their importance. As far as we are aware, no other piece has explicitly sought to evaluate 
the effect of professionalism on officer opinions. Thus the results we present here add an 
                                                 
54 Phrutipongse Prayoonsiri, “Khwaamkhid Thaang Kaanmyang Khɔɔng Naajthahaan Radab Suung Khɔɔng 
Kɔɔngthab Thaj Thii Sygsaa Naj Widthajaalaj Pɔngkan Raadcha?aanaacag Run 30-33 [Political Thinking of High 
Ranking Military Officers in the National Defense College, class 30-33]” (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 
1992), 174-176. 
55 Varunee Kittithamavoot, “Khwaamkhid Thaang Kaanmyang lε? Kaanjɔɔmrab Rabɔɔb Prachaathipataj khɔɔng 
Naajthahaan naj Roongrian Seenaathikaan Thahaanbog Laksuud Lakpracam lε?Laksuud Sinlapa?saat 
Mahaabandid (Kaanthahaan) [The Political Thinkings and the Acceptance of Democracy of the Student Officers in 
the Army General Command and Staff College’s Regular and Master of Military Science Programs]” (MA Thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University, 1991), 207-212.  
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important dimension to understanding the role that professionalism plays in determining the 
actions of the Thai military. We now turn to our data.  
Data Collection 
 We draw our data from a survey of 569 military officers in Thailand.56 As far as we are 
aware, this is the first survey of its size and breadth available for academic use, and it relied on 
unprecedented access to military officers granted by the Thai armed forces.57  The first author of 
the paper conducted the survey as part of a project in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense 
and with support from the Thailand Research Fund. The purpose of the questionnaire was to 
evaluate professional ethics among military officers and determine the distribution of those 
ethics across different branches of the armed services including the Army, Air Force, and Navy. 
The questionnaire included a battery of queries useful for measuring professionalism as well as 
one question specifically designed to gauge officer’s opinions regarding military intervention in 
politics.   
 With cooperation from the Ministry of Defense, a primary, exploratory round of the 
survey was administered in early 2011. The primary round was followed by focus groups, after 
                                                 
56 Respondents included 300 commissioned officers and 260 non-commissioned officers (NCO). There are 
important distinctions in the training programs of both of these groups, and NCO often have limited opportunities 
for advancement in the officer ranks. Coup leaders come from commissioned officers. We chose to retain both 
groups in our analysis, though, as the support and obedience of NCO are essential for military operations, especially 
in the event of a coup. Throughout the following analysis when we use the term “officer” in reference to the survey, 
we are referring to both commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The focus groups and interviews, in contrast, 
included only commissioned officers of high rank. 
57 While the Thai language literature includes a number of surveys of military officers, the vast majority of these 
have to do with health issues. Examples can be found in Weedsaan Phεεd Tahaanbog [Royal Thai Army Medical 
Journal] and Waarasaan Phajaabaan Thahaanbog [Journal of the Royal Thai Army Nurses].   
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which the survey was revised to reflect some necessary changes. The full survey was then 
distributed to approximately 800 military officers through the Ministry of Defense. 569 officers 
completed and returned the survey making the response rate approximately 71 percent. The 
survey was followed by another focus group composed of high-ranking officers. The authors of 
this paper then conducted follow-up interviews with military officers in early 2014.  
Unfortunately, due to the nature of cooperating with the Ministry of Defense, survey 
respondents were not chosen through random selection. The strongest efforts were taken on 
behalf of the researchers to ensure that responses were gathered across military branches and 
across military ranks. The Ministry of Defense, though, had the final say in distribution. As such, 
we must remain aware of the potential for bias as we draw conclusions from the sample 
regarding the broader body of the Thai military, especially since the survey oversamples the Air 
Force and Navy and contains a disproportionately smaller number of Army officers. Despite the 
lack of random sample and the skewed representation, though, the unprecedented access and 
breadth of the survey makes it the most comprehensive snap shot of the Thai military that we are 
aware of. The descriptive statistics of the survey can be found in Table 1.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The majority of survey questions were posed as statements with which the respondent 
could indicate his or her agreement or disagreement along Likert scale measures. Instructions 
were given to tick one of five categories ranging from “least important” to “most important” or 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” All survey questions were posed in Thai; subsequent 
translation to English was conducted by the authors of this essay.  
Measuring Professionalism and Its Effect 
Measuring Professionalism 
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 The first task necessary for analysis is to develop measures of professionalism from the 
survey data. To do this we turned to Huntington’s work, drawing out the three components of his 
professionalism definition: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.  
The initial component of military professionalism is expertise. Huntington argued that 
“expertise is only acquired by prolonged education and experience.”58 In our dataset two 
responses were directly related to this definition: education level and years of military service. 
Education was ranked on a scale of one to four including: less than a bachelor’s degree, 
bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and doctoral degree. Years of military service was also 
ranked on a scale from one to four with categories being 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 10-20 years, and 
over 20 years. Higher scores along both of these measures should indicate higher levels of 
expertise and thus a greater degree of professionalism.  
Second, Huntington defined responsibility as the “technical love [a professional has] for 
his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize his craft for the benefit of society.”59 We 
focused on the “social obligation” portion of this definition. From the survey we chose five 
indicators for a military officer’s level of social responsibility. These were drawn from officer 
responses to the statements found in Table 2. Each of these responses was selected as they 
represent officers’ opinions toward employing their military expertise for the benefit of society. 
The responses were based on officers’ rankings of the statements along a Likert scale with five 
points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. These five responses were then combined into an 
index variable.60 
                                                 
58 Huntington, Soldier, 8.  
59 Huntington, Soldier, 15.  
60 Testing for internal consistency along these indicators resulted in a Chronbach’s Alpha of 0.775. Factor analysis 
was also employed as a secondary check, resulting in a single factor.  
20 
 
 The final component of professionalism is corporateness, which Huntington defined as 
the “sense of unity … which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence 
and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.”61 Here again we chose 
five indicators based on the definition. These were also combined into an index variable.62 
The results of the survey indicate that generally the officers in our sample exhibited 
relatively high levels of professionalism. Averages of both the responsibility and corporateness 
index scores were above four on a scale of one to five. In other words, Thai military officers in 
our sample do feel a great deal of social responsibility as well as strong ties and unity with the 
military. Expertise, though, is less clearly distributed. This is likely due to the fact that our 
sample population had a large proportion of officers with 10 or fewer years of service (50.3 
percent of the sample) as well as those with less than a four-year degree (33.4 percent of the 
sample, primarily among the NCO). Even so, over two thirds of our respondents had at least a 
bachelor’s degree and approximately 65 percent served in the military for at least five years. 
Summary statistics of these measures as well as the indicators which were used can all be found 
in Table 2.   
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
These results lead us to note that the majority of respondents in our survey could be 
considered professional soldiers according to Huntington’s definition.  If the survey were 
representative of the entire military, we could argue that Thailand’s officer corps could largely 
                                                 
61 Huntington, Soldier, 10.  
62 Testing for internal consistency among these indicators resulted in a Chronbach’s Alpha of 0.812. Factor analysis 
also resulted in a single factor.  
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be considered professionals.63 During focus groups as well as interviews, active military officers 
generally exhibit high levels of social responsibility and a strong degree of corporateness. Most 
officers are also subjected to significant periods of training and practice in order to develop their 
expertise.64 In fact, the military training draws from the West Point curriculum, and officers are 
aware of Huntington’s thesis.65 One interviewee estimated that half of officer training was 
focused on inculcating the values of professionalism among soldiers.66 
Testing the Huntington Hypothesis 
 If Thai military officers are professional, then, Huntington’s hypothesis would predict 
that they should prefer to remain apolitical. Yet the military as an organization reentered politics 
in 2006. What then can explain the military’s decision to return to politics? Again, we emphasize 
that professionalism should not be judged at the organizational level. Instead it should be applied 
to either groups or individual officers. Thus, if the Huntington hypothesis were true, professional 
soldiers may abstain from political activity while their less professional counterparts intervene.  
 Of course the alternative, posed by a number of Huntington’s critics, is that professional 
soldiers do actually have incentives to engage in politics.67 These two competing hypotheses 
                                                 
63 As mentioned before, since it was not a random sample, we must exercise some caution. Even so, as we have been 
granted broad access to military officers for the survey, and considering that the survey did receive a response from 
a wide range of officers, we proceed to draw conclusions as best we can from the data.   
64 Air Force Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014; Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 
26 January 2014; Naval Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 30 January 2014; ACM Anan Klintha, interview by 
authors, Bangkok, 28 January 2014.  
65 Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014.  
66 Air Force Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014.  
67 Finer, Horseback; Nordlinger, Soldiers; Ockey, “Professional Soldiers.”  
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invoke the question of the effect of professionalism on the probability that a soldier will become 
involved in politics.  
 The survey included a measure of military officers’ opinions about military intervention 
in politics in order to assess this question. The respondents ranked the value they placed on the 
following statement: “I believe that soldiers should not become involved in politics.”68 Again, 
officers ranked their views on a scale of one to five, with five being the score associated with a 
great deal of importance placed on the statement and one being the score of those who did not 
support the statement. The vast majority of military officers felt that the military should not be 
involved in politics. Out of 561 valid responses, approximately 72 percent of respondents (403 
respondents) marked either four or five on the survey, demonstrating their disapproval of 
military intervention in politics. Slightly over 12 percent of the officers surveyed (69 
respondents), though, scored either a one or two, indicating that they felt the military still has a 
role in politics.69 The distribution of responses is presented in Figure 1.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Using just these numbers we might hypothesize that the professional soldiers, or those 
who scored high on professional marks, should have also expressed higher marks in their 
response to this question. This, though, is a question subject to statistical testing. In essence, if 
Huntington is correct and professionalism does lead military officers to prefer to stay out of 
politics, then we should observe a positive correlation between our measures of professionalism 
and a military officer’s opinion about remaining out of politics. On the other hand, if 
                                                 
68 Emphasis in original. “Khaaphacaw chya waa tahaan maj khuan khaw paj mii bodbaad thaang kaanmyang.”  
69 Follow-up interviews and focus groups suggested that these numbers were likely underestimating the support for 
political interventions.  
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Huntington’s critics were correct and professionalism could lead to intervention, we should 
expect to see a negative correlation between measures of professionalism and a military officer’s 
opinion about being apolitical.  
 Using officers’ opinions about military involvement in politics as the dependent variable, 
scaled one through five with higher scores reflecting support for an apolitical military, we 
applied our measures of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness in a regression model. These 
results are labeled as Model A. We used our index variables as measures of responsibility and 
corporateness, while education and years of military service were included separately.70  
 We also included a model that incorporated three control variables which could explain 
an officer’s opinion about military interventions in politics, reported as Model B. First, we 
hypothesize that older officers may be more committed to the military’s role in politics as those 
officers would have had more experience under military rule. Second, we also include a variable 
measuring military rank, as perhaps those of higher rank may also have stronger interests in 
politics. Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the officer was a 
member of the Army as military coups in Thailand are generally led by Army officers.  
 AGE and Years of Military Service, though, are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation of 
0.845). While not perfectly corresponding, this does cause us to question the value of using both 
variables, as they may be measuring approximately the same thing. In other words, we may run 
the risk of multicollinearity. Thus we ran a second model wherein we did not include the AGE 
variable. This is reported as Model C. We also ran a third model where we included AGE but 
                                                 
70 We also conducted a second set of regression models substituting predicted latent variables drawn from factor 
analysis for both responsibility and corporateness. These alternate models produced outcomes consistent with those 
reported here. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.   
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dropped Years of Military Service. This is Model D. The results of the linear models can be seen 
in Table 3.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The statistical results provide some interesting findings.71 First, in Model A, which only 
included measures of professionalism, we see that only Corporateness has a statistically 
significant relationship with our dependent variable. It is positive, which is in the direction 
predicted by Huntington’s hypothesis. Thus it appears that increasing feelings of unity with the 
military body are positively correlated with an opinion that the military should remain apolitical. 
This result is consistent across all four of the models we tested. The effect of the other 
components of professionalism, expertise and responsibility, though, is not sufficient to 
disqualify the claim that there is no effect. 
 Second, in our other models which included control variables, the effects of our 
professionalism measures changed only slightly. In Model C, education appeared to have a 
slightly significant positive effect. In fact, throughout all models that contained control variables, 
education’s effect was almost statistically significant. This would indicate that high levels of 
education are likely also correlated to the probability that a military officer would prefer an 
apolitical military. While this is promising, we are also cautious about drawing too strong a 
conclusion regarding this relationship.  
                                                 
71 We conducted the same analysis using only the data from the 300 commissioned officers as a check on our 
findings. The results were largely consistent with those presented here. In these tests, the only consistent significant 
effect observed was again a positive relationship between corporateness and the preference for an apolitical military. 
Results available on request.  
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 Among our control variables, only rank maintained a consistent, and negative, effect. 
Thus it appears that, at least among our sample, lower ranking Thai officers are more likely to 
espouse the opinion that the military should not be involved in politics.  
 These models indicate that, out of our measures of professionalism, only an officer’s 
sense of corporateness has a consistent correlation with his or her opinion of military 
involvement in politics.  
Discussion 
 What do these findings mean for the relationship between professionalism and an 
apolitical military in Thailand?  
First, it appears that, at least among the officers in our sample, only one aspect of 
professionalism from Huntington’s definition was related to their opinions about military 
intervention in politics. Corporateness, or feelings of military unity and coherence, does seem to 
be associated with support for an apolitical military. We argue, along similar lines to Geddes, 
that one of the main concerns of military officers is maintaining unity within the organization.72 
Involvement in politics undermines this unity. Indeed, Thailand’s military is riddled with 
factions that become increasingly salient when the organization intervenes in politics.73 For 
instance, after the 2006 coup and the strife which followed, military leadership struggled to root 
out those branded “watermelon soldiers,” a label based on the color-coded conflict in Thai 
politics. Red was the color worn by supporters of the elected government ousted by the military. 
                                                 
72 Geddes, “Democratization,” 125-129. 
73 Chambers, Knights, 366-376; McCargo and Ukrist, Thaksinization, 134-140; Ockey, “Professional Soldiers,” 100-
107. The military is only one example in Thai society of how unity to factions or networks shape social and political 
behavior. McCargo, “Network Monarchy,” 500-503. Joseph Harris, “Who Governs? Autonomous Political 
Networks as a Challenge to Power in Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 45, No 1 (2015): 5-7.  
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“Watermelon soldiers” were officers who wore the green military fatigues but were red on the 
inside, meaning either sympathetic to or loyal to the party ousted by the coup. Such disunity and 
mistrust created “discomfort among professional soldiers who may truly be colourless but are 
being watched with suspicion anyway.”74 Interviews with military officers also indicated 
uneasiness with the lack of unity which comes from political intervention.75 Thus having an 
increased feeling of corporateness, or a desire for unity, would logically fit well with a Thai 
soldier’s desire to remain apolitical.  
 At the same time, increased levels of corporateness would also be associated with a 
desire to follow orders to maintain unity. Thus soldiers who highly valued unity would follow 
orders to conduct a coup despite their own preferences to remain apolitical. One interviewee 
explained that even if officers held deep-seated reservations, “we have to obey our leaders.”76 
High levels of coporateness within the military, therefore, could imply that only a small number 
of well-placed officers are necessary to make the decision to intervene in politics; tied with the 
importance of factions in the Thai military discussed above, such compelling feelings of unity 
could open opportunities for a small number of officers to easily direct the organization toward 
political actions. Indeed, with our finding that higher ranking officers in our sample are more 
likely to favor political interventions, corporateness among lower ranking officers may run 
counter to the goal of civilian control.  
 Responsibility, on the other hand, does not appear to be linked with officer opinions on 
military intervention. This may be due to the contrasting pulls and pushes of high levels of 
                                                 
74 Wassana Nanuam, “Hunt for the ‘Watermelons’ is Upsetting Career Soldiers,” Bangkok Post, April 8, 2010.  
75 Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014; Air Force Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 
26 January 2014.  
76 Air Force Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014.  
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responsibility. Indeed, one army officer we interviewed said, “Most of us feel responsibility to 
not get involved in politics, but we also feel a responsibility for the security of the country and 
the people.”77 Thus high levels of responsibility may have dual effects, which may be what is 
driving the fact that neither Huntington nor his critics receive support from our data.  
 Levels of expertise also appeared to have little effect. There is some weak evidence that 
higher levels of education are associated with a desire to remain out of politics. As the 
relationship is weak, we cannot draw too many conclusions regarding the effect. Even so, if there 
is an effect, it does not necessarily follow that highly educated officers would find their way into 
positions of authority. The promotion system is based largely on patronage and cohort 
relationships. Taking time away from the ranks to pursue education beyond a bachelor’s degree 
means sacrificing networking and promotion opportunities, especially if the degree takes an 
officer overseas. Some officers who return to the military after pursuing post-secondary 
education return to find the doors to promotion closed as younger officers from competing 
cohorts have already eclipsed them.78  
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that training efforts to increase professionalism do not 
necessarily lead officers away from military intervention in politics. Many prominent members 
of the Thai military officer corps have taken part in the International Military Education and 
Training program operated by the US Military.79 The program is geared towards exposing 
military officers to democratic values, increasing their professionalism, as well as encouraging 
international military cooperation. Among the officers who have participated in this and other 
                                                 
77 Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014.   
78 Army Officer, interview by authors, Bangkok, 26 January 2014. 
79 See Taw, Case Studies in US IMET Training, 20-27.   
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professionalization programs of the American military are many who have led coups or been 
involved in military rule, such as Suchinda Kraprayoon and Sonthi Boonyaratglin.  
Thus it appears that professionalism, as a concept defined by expertise, responsibility, 
and corporateness, is not the best predictor of whether a military officer prefers to remain 
apolitical. Nor does it follow that increasing these characteristics among Thai military officers 
would actually result in a less political military.  
Professionals and Politics 
 The results presented here provide three major contributions to our understanding of 
civil-military relations as well as the military in Thailand. First, we overcome the obstacles to 
empirical testing of the professionalism hypothesis found in the literature through our use of a 
survey of Thai military officers. We were able to identify measures of the three aspects of 
professionalism according to Huntington’s definition: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 
Thanks to the individual level data, we were then able to gauge these for military officers, 
demonstrating that most of the officers in our survey scored highly along these measures. This 
indicates a high degree of professionalism among the Thai officer corps. Admittedly, the data 
which we used in this analysis is not a random sample of the Thai military, nor was it a complete 
picture of the entire organization, thus we must be modest about our claims regarding the entire 
military. Even so, broad access was granted by Thailand’s Ministry of Defense to conduct a 
survey of military officers, and the survey did capture a wide spectrum of military officials. 
 Second, this survey allows us to test the effect of professionalism on officers’ opinions 
regarding military intervention in politics. The test results show that degree of professionalism, 
at least as defined by Huntington, is only partially related to an officer’s opinion regarding 
whether or not the military should be involved in politics. Only on the measure of corporateness 
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did we see a consistent relationship. With both academic and policy circles often citing 
professionalism as a solution to a politicized military, our findings suggest that continued 
attempts to increase the professionalization of the Thai military may not achieve stated goals of 
making the armed forces apolitical.  
 Finally we add to the literature describing the motivations of Thai military officers.  
Through the survey, focus groups, and interviews, we provide a glimpse of opinions within the 
military regarding political interventions. By showing that professionalism, at least as 
Huntington construed it, is largely unrelated to these opinions, we are able to set aside the much-
touted claim that increasing professionalism training would improve civilian control over the 
military. We also found a negative correlation between rank and the desire to remain apolitical, 
showing that officers of higher rank tend to favor military intervention more than their 
subordinates. This adds to the relatively sparse body of Thailand-specific literature on push 
factors that shape military interventions in politics.  
 Of course, there are limits to what the data can tell us. Due to the constraints of working 
with the military, our survey sample was not representative. Air Force and Navy officers were 
overrepresented in the sample, and respondents were not randomly selected. The survey 
questions considered here told us little about factions or their role in shaping officer opinions, an 
issue that is of vital interest in understanding internal politics of the Thai military. Despite these 
shortcomings, the results, combined with the information drawn from focus groups and 
interviews, serve as an important step in understanding why the Thai military remains entwined 
in politics, if for no other reason than we can eliminate one of the hypothesized reasons that a 
military might not become involved in politics. Our data, drawn from the survey as well as 
interviews, shows conclusively that professional soldiers can still favor political intervention.    
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Although this research is limited to Thailand, the findings have broader implications for 
militaries in developing countries. Much military training around the world operates on the basic 
application of Huntington’s thesis that a professional military is apolitical. We demonstrate that 
the fundamental assumption undergirding this type of training is flawed. This suggests that 
experts seeking to diminish military influence in politics should look beyond a focus on training, 
as increasing professionalism among the officer corps does not necessarily mean the 
depoliticization of the military.  
We suggest that regardless of the degree of professionalism in the Thai military, 
professionalism is not the key to understanding the actions of Thai officers in the political arena. 
While officers’ feelings of social responsibility may endow them with the opinion that the 
military should remain outside of the political sphere, this feeling of obligation could cut both 
ways. Thai protest groups, especially in recent years, call upon the military to stage coups to 
overturn what the groups perceive as unjust government. Feelings of responsibility may cause 
military officers to side with these groups, thus linking responsibility to the possibility of 
military involvement in politics. Increased corporateness also could limit the effectiveness of 
increasing professionalism in reducing military interventions as pressures to maintain unity, 
especially among junior officers, may reduce internal military demands to remain apolitical.  
These findings provide empirical support for Feaver’s call to move beyond the 
professionalism hypothesis.80 In Thai studies, this means that many scholars interested in 
military interventions are correctly seeking to understand the sociopolitical factors that pull the 
military toward politics. Such studies will continue to provide important insights into Thai 
politics. Even so, further research, both theoretical and empirical, remains to be done on the 
                                                 
80 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 235-236.  
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incentive structures that push Thai military officers toward politics.  More detailed understanding 
of military factions and their interactions, systems of advancement and promotion, training 
within the organization, and the distribution of military budgets could inform both theoretical 
and policy debates about civil-military relations in Thailand.81   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 See Claude Welch, Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1976), 317-326.  
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Table 1  
Description of Survey Respondents 
  
Frequency 
Percent of 
Respondents* 
Gender Male 557 97.9 
 Female 3 0.5 
    
Age Range 20-30 113 19.9 
 30-40 320 56.2 
 40-50 84 14.8 
 50-60 44 7.7 
 60+ 1 0.2 
    
Rank Nai Phon (General)  9 1.6 
 Nai Phan (Col., Lt. Col., Maj.) 194 34.1 
 Nai Roi (Capt., 1st Lt., 2d Lt.) 105 18.5 
 Nai Sib/Ja (Sgt., Cpl., PFC)  241 42.4 
 Phan Ja (Warrant Officer) 1 0.2 
    
Education PhD Degree 8 1.4 
 MA Degree 85 14.9 
 Bachelor’s Degree 258 45.3 
 Less than Bachelor’s  190 33.4 
    
Years of 
Service 
0-5 87 15.3 
6-10 199 35 
 10-20 156 27.4 
 20+ 93 16.3 
    
Branch of 
Military  
Army 148 26 
Navy 191 33.6 
 Air Force 230 40.4 
* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to missing responses 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics of Survey 
 Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
“I believe that soldiers should not become involved in 
politics”  
561 3.897 1.176 1 5 
 
Responsibility Indicators 
     
R1: “Military officers must realize that their basic duty 
is to protect the country.”  
561 4.636 0.843 1 5 
R2: “Military officers have a duty in developing the 
country both in times of peace and war.”  
561 4.275 0.908 1 5 
R3: “I believe that military officers must support 
government policy in relieving public suffering.” 
552 4.029 1.140 1 5 
R4: “I believe that military officers work to help the 
public with all their capacity both in peace and 
wartime.”  
553 4.344 0.879 1 5 
R5: “I believe military officers have a favorable 
disposition toward the public.” 
552 4.290 0.905 1 5 
 
Responsibility Index Variable 
 
550 
 
4.32 
 
0.674 
 
1 
 
5 
 
Corporateness Indicators 
     
C1: “I believe military officers have love for the 
organization [military].” 
560 4.136 0.850 1 5 
C2: “I understand the code of ethics of the Department 
of Defense.”  
560 3.625 0.951 1 5 
C3: “I work in strict accordance to the orders of my 
superior officers.”  
561 4.357 0.803 1 5 
C4: “I follow the responsibilities given me by my 
superior officers without questioning whether or not 
they are part of my duties.”  
561 3.906 0.902 1 5 
C5: “I revere and give respect to senior officers, even 
if they are retired.”  
560 4.375 0.834 1 5 
 
Corporateness Index Variable 
 
558 
 
4.079 
 
0.656 
 
1 
 
5 
 
Expertise Measures 
     
Education 541 1.835 0.736 1 4 
Years of Military Experience 535 2.477 0.961 1 4 
 
Controls 
     
Age 562 2.110 0.818 1 5 
Army Variable 569 0.260 0.439 0 1 
Rank 550 2.943 0.928 1 5 
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Table 3 
Regression Results for Officer Opinions on  
Military Involvement in Politics 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
AGE  -0.212 
(0.134) 
 -0.020 
(0.080) 
Army Variable  -0.092 
(0.136) 
-0.098 
(0.137) 
-0.060 
(0.129) 
Rank  -0.248* 
(0.098) 
 
-0.252* 
(0.098) 
-0.206* 
(0.094) 
Education  0.033 
(0.706) 
0.202 
(0.114) 
 
0.230* 
(0.112) 
0.204 
(0.111) 
Years of Mil. 
Service 
-0.049 
(0.059) 
0.205 
(0.111) 
 
0.052 
(0.071) 
 
Responsibility 0.156 
(0.119) 
0.159 
(0.120) 
 
0.153 
(0.121) 
0.135 
(0.112) 
 
Corporateness 0.386** 
(0.123) 
0.370** 
(0.127) 
 
0.382** 
(0.127) 
0.413** 
(0.121) 
Constant 1.690** 
(0.402) 
2.022** 
(0.424) 
 
1.893** 
(0.406) 
1.947** 
(0.387) 
     
Observations  501 495 495 519 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.073 0.093 0.087 0.091 
     
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Respondent Opinions on Military Involvement in Politics 
 
 
 
